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When everyone was suspicious

The Political-Social Brigade secret police became one of the main instruments of espionage and repression of the Franco regime, as well as a key player in helping the regime survive for some four decades

A 1949 British Foreign Office report showed that the Brigade’s archives were based on the Nazi model
The Brigade had spies embedded in anti-Franco organisations, universities, factories, and even churches
The Brigade also had some resounding failures, such as opposition actions they were unable to prevent

In his Dic­tio­nary on Fran­co­ism, Manuel Vázquez Mon­talbán wrote that the Po­lit­i­cal-So­cial Brigade, of­fi­cially the So­cial In­ves­ti­ga­tion Brigade and pop­u­larly known as “the So­cial” or “the Se­cret”, was “the true Prae­to­rian Guard” of the Franco dic­ta­tor­ship. From the out­set, the regime had con­sid­ered its sur­vival de­pen­dent on the ex­ter­mi­na­tion and sys­tem­atic per­se­cu­tion of those it saw as po­lit­i­cal op­po­nents; and it de­voted it­self heart and soul to this task. The re­pres­sion lasted until the dic­ta­tor’s final breath (and even con­tin­ued after his death) and man­aged to keep a large part of the pop­u­la­tion ac­qui­es­cent after the drama of the civil war and the se­ries of sum­mary ex­e­cu­tions in the early post-war pe­riod.

One of Franco’s in­te­rior min­is­ters, Ramon Ser­rano Suñer, ex­plains in his mem­oirs that the sup­port­ers of the Re­pub­lic were con­sid­ered “in­ter­nal en­e­mies” that were des­tined to be strongly re­pressed. Even be­fore the end of the war, leg­is­la­tion ap­peared against those who had con­tributed to “cre­at­ing or ag­gra­vat­ing the sub­ver­sion of all kinds to which Spain fell vic­tim and who, from July 18, 1936, have op­posed the Na­tional Move­ment with spe­cific acts or with se­ri­ous pas­siv­ity.” This ex­cerpt is from the Po­lit­i­cal Re­spon­si­bil­i­ties Act, which passed on Feb­ru­ary 9, 1939 and which out­lawed all “po­lit­i­cal and so­cial groups” that had formed part of the Pop­u­lar Front, “its al­lies, sep­a­ratist or­gan­i­sa­tions, and all those who have op­posed the Na­tional Move­ment.”

Al­most at the same time, the Po­lit­i­cal-So­cial Brigade, the main in­stru­ment of the Franco regime’s re­pres­sion, began to take shape. The first time it was men­tioned in the press was on April 18, 1939, in an ar­ti­cle in La Van­guardia Española that re­ferred to the ar­rest of Segi­mon Mas, a mil­i­tant of the Marx­ist Uni­fi­ca­tion Work­ers’ Party (POUM) and close friend of An­dreu Nin, who had taken part in the fight against the at­tempted coup of July 18 in Cam­brils. Two years after this first ref­er­ence, the So­cial In­ves­ti­ga­tion Brigade was cre­ated, which to­gether with the In­for­ma­tion Ser­vices of the Civil Guard and the Pha­lange, was in charge of po­lit­i­cal re­pres­sion through sur­veil­lance, seizures of pri­vate cor­re­spon­dence, tap­ping tele­phone calls and ar­rests.

The Po­lit­i­cal-So­cial Brigade and the whole ap­pa­ra­tus of po­lit­i­cal re­pres­sion in gen­eral were made in the like­ness of the Ger­man model. Ac­cord­ing to a 1949 British For­eign Of­fice re­port, as re­vealed by his­to­rian Pablo Ancántara, the Brigades archives “are based on the Nazi model, en­sur­ing sys­tem­atic sur­veil­lance of all sus­pected en­e­mies in the state.” All po­lit­i­cal cases fell within the Po­lit­i­cal-So­cial Brigade’s scope, which acted by order of the chief of po­lice. The doc­u­ment also sum­marised the PSB’s meth­ods, which re­mained un­changed until the dic­ta­tor’s death: “The in­ter­ro­ga­tion of a pris­oner may in­clude the use of cruel arte­facts, which tend to force state­ments, later called con­fes­sions. At the end of the case, the pris­oner is trans­ferred to one of the state pris­ons and is sub­ject to mil­i­tary ju­ris­dic­tion.” Even be­fore the end of the Civil War, in 1938, Hein­rich Himm­ler, head of the Gestapo and com­man­der-in-chief of the SS, pro­posed a co­op­er­a­tion agree­ment be­tween the Span­ish and Ger­man po­lice, which was later signed in the 1940s.

An­toni Batista, au­thor of a book on the Po­lit­i­cal-So­cial Brigade, La Brigada So­cial (Empúries, 1995), points out that this po­lit­i­cal po­lice force was in charge of per­se­cut­ing “every­thing that is not pros­e­cutable in a democ­racy, all those rights whose pro­hi­bi­tion a dic­ta­tor­ship de­fines as pas­sive: thought, ide­ol­ogy, ex­pres­sion, gath­er­ing, demon­strat­ing, strik­ing.” The Brigade had spies em­bed­ded in anti-Franco or­gan­i­sa­tions, uni­ver­si­ties, fac­to­ries, and even churches. Some of their re­ports pre­served in the archives of civil­ian gov­ern­ments give an idea of the regime’s ob­ses­sion with keep­ing an eye on every­thing and de­tect­ing en­e­mies every­where it could.

Ob­ses­sive per­se­cu­tion

The Brigade was ob­ses­sive in its es­pi­onage. Batista’s re­search into po­lice records found, for ex­am­ple, that the “Group II of Anti-Cata­lan Ac­tiv­i­ties” had a file on such a dan­ger­ous fig­ure as the Cata­lan poet Sal­vador Es­priu. The doc­u­ment stressed that “he en­joys great pres­tige among pro-Cata­lan el­e­ments” and that “he has al­ways shown him­self to be a pro­gres­sive Cata­lan na­tion­al­ist, at­tack­ing the Regime. He en­joys spe­cial pres­tige for his book La pell de brau, in which in­sult­ing con­cepts against the Regime ap­pear.” In re­al­ity, the in­sult­ing con­cepts were re­quests for di­a­logue be­tween Cat­alo­nia and Spain. An­other note re­ferred to a lec­ture given by Josep Maria Castell on Es­priu, stat­ing that the of­fence they were both guilty of was that “they speak Cata­lan”.

Sal­vador Es­priu is an ex­am­ple of the sys­tem­atic per­se­cu­tion to which artists, work­ers, politi­cians and even clergy were sub­ject. Es­priu’s records were in the files of “Cata­lan-sep­a­ratists” along with Josep Benet, Joan Manuel Ser­rat, Oriol Bo­hi­gas, Alexan­dre Cirici, Joan Brossa, Romà Gu­bern and Quico Pi de la Serra, among oth­ers. An­other fig­ure under sus­pi­cion was the singer-song­writer Lluís Llach. One of the many re­ports in his file pointed out that “the lyrics of his songs, all of which are in the ver­nac­u­lar lan­guage, are of a marked Cata­lan sep­a­ratist char­ac­ter, hint­ing in his verses at the op­pres­sion to which Cat­alo­nia is sub­jected, and that the mo­ment of its re­lease is ap­proach­ing.” Yet what wor­ried them most was that “be­fore and dur­ing the per­for­mance of his songs, he ex­cites the au­di­ence, who often in­ter­rupt him with ap­plause.”

Cata­lan music was sys­tem­at­i­cally mon­i­tored, as it was seen as a plat­form for mo­bil­is­ing the masses, and what hap­pened at con­certs and the lyrics of songs caused the regime great dis­tress. A good ex­am­ple is found in the re­port of the well-known con­cert that Rai­mon gave at the Palau d’Es­ports in Barcelona on Oc­to­ber 30, 1975, only a month after the ex­e­cu­tion of Basque mil­i­tant, Txiki. The some­what para­noid-sound­ing po­lice re­port said the event was at­tended by about 10,000 peo­ple “mostly young peo­ple be­tween 20 and 22 years old, all of them hairy”. And that dur­ing the songs, peo­ple “ap­plauded and shouted ’Free­dom, free­dom’ and ’Down with the regime’. The au­di­ence re­acted like an en­raged crowd.”

The clergy were also per­se­cuted, in­clud­ing some well-known cases such as Lluís Hernández, who was mayor of Santa Coloma de Gramenet, Lluís Maria Xiri­nachs, a sen­a­tor and a lead­ing fig­ure in favour of in­de­pen­dence, and Joan Subirà, who com­bined teach­ing with jour­nal­ism. Subirà’s file in­di­cated that he had an “openly Marx­ist and sep­a­ratist ide­ol­ogy hos­tile to the Regime”, with a “back­ground re­lated to el­e­ments of Work­ers’ Com­mis­sions”. And, above all, he was ac­cused of mak­ing such dan­ger­ous re­quests as “send sweets to the de­tainees”.

Some fail­ures

The Brigade also had some re­sound­ing fail­ures, such as op­po­si­tion ac­tions they were un­able to pre­vent or oth­ers where they ar­rived too late. One of these was what hap­pened at the meet­ing in 1966 known as La Ca­putx­i­nada, in which the au­thor­i­ties were too late to pre­vent the act of con­sti­tu­tion of the De­mo­c­ra­tic Union of Stu­dents of the Uni­ver­sity of Barcelona. The regime sent the Brigade in force along with a squad of armed po­lice, who made a lot of ar­rests. Yet to do so they were forced to vi­o­late the Con­cor­dat agree­ment with the Catholic Church and suf­fer the bad pub­lic­ity that came with it. On top of that, a team from French tele­vi­sion that had come to do a re­port on Rai­mon hap­pened to be there and filmed a cav­alry charge against a group of Ca­puchin priests sit­ting peace­fully on the con­vent es­planade.

The Brigade also failed to stop the con­stituent ses­sion of the As­sem­bly of Cat­alo­nia, the main plat­form of the anti-Franco op­po­si­tion, which of­fi­cial re­ports de­scribed as a “con­stant con­cern” of the Chief of Po­lice. On Sun­day, No­vem­ber 7, 1971, politi­cians of all per­sua­sions and rep­re­sen­ta­tives of so­cial move­ments man­aged to gather to­gether in the church of St. Au­gus­tine and draw up a man­i­festo for democ­racy and au­ton­omy.

How­ever, two years later, the Po­lit­i­cal-So­cial Brigade, in col­lab­o­ra­tion with groups of armed po­lice, man­aged to ar­rest the Par­lia­men­tary Com­mis­sion; some 113 peo­ple gath­ered in the church of Maria Mit­jancera. In this case, a net­work of po­lice in­form­ers had told the Brigade the day of the meet­ing. Based on the in­tel­li­gence, they set up sur­veil­lance in re­li­gious cen­tres, the usual meet­ing places for the As­sem­bly. The Brigade closely fol­lowed the move­ments of the As­sem­bly of Cat­alo­nia and man­aged to frus­trate the first ses­sion thanks to re­ports from an in­for­mant, who pro­vided them with the place and the pass­word. From then on they lis­tened in on the tele­phone calls of Dr. Joan Colomines,, who they con­sid­ered to be the “or­gan­is­ing soul” of the move­ment, as well as other fig­ures like Josep An­dreu Abelló, An­toni Gutiérrez Díaz, Marià d’Abadal and Joan Raventós, to whom they at­trib­uted the re­spon­si­bil­ity “of no­ti­fy­ing peo­ple to at­tend the As­sem­bly of Cat­alo­nia”.

fea­ture A his­tory of spy­ing on Cata­lans

fea­ture A his­tory of spy­ing on Cata­lans

“Self-proclaimed president”

A dangerous cellist

The Franco regime also spied on musicians it considered to be “dangerous”. The historian Josep Maria Figueras, who has just published a comprehensive biography on the famous Catalan cellist Pau Casals, has located five voluminous files on the musician among the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which are stored in the Archive of National History. All sorts of information is to be found in these files, such as memos, reports, notes, letters and press releases. And, as Figueres points out, they show the systematic surveillance that Casals was subjected to. The documents cover a very long period from 1935 to 1972, a year before the cellist’s death.

In some cases, the regime was not content to just monitor Casals, but also did its best to frustrate his actions. An example was on 23 September, 1965, when Antonio Garrigues sent a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fernando M. Castiella, boasting about getting a concert by Casals cancelled. “There will be no concert, so there will be no problem,” he wrote. On another occasion, the Spanish ambassador became furious after a charity concert by Casals went ahead in the Dominican Republic.

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