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The spying has been going on for a long time

With the fallout from the Catalangate scandal dominating the headlines, we take a look at the long history of surveillance by the Spanish authorities on the Catalan pro-independence movement

The surveillance of Catalans “was more or less constant from the start of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship”
Macià evaded arrest in Lleida to settle in the Hotel de France in Perpignan. The Spanish authorities followed his movements closely
Another focus of Spanish espionage was the city of Toulouse, where there was an active nucleus of Catalan nationalists

The Span­ish au­thor­i­ties are ob­sessed with Cata­lan na­tion­al­ism.” This re­flec­tion is from a re­port sent by an of­fi­cial in Per­pig­nan to the French in­te­rior min­is­ter on 20 Feb­ru­ary, 1926. And if we look at the level of sur­veil­lance that the Cata­lan politi­cians who sought refuge in France at that time were sub­jected to, it does seem to have been a faith­ful re­flec­tion of re­al­ity. It had been just over two years since the Miguel Primo de Rivera dic­ta­tor­ship had seized power in Spain and had been pur­su­ing sep­a­ratists both at home and abroad.

Only days after the Primo de Rivera regime took con­trol, mil­i­tary courts were given the power to pros­e­cute “crimes against the se­cu­rity and unity of the home­land… whether orally, in writ­ing, through the press or any other me­chan­i­cal or graphic means of ad­ver­tis­ing and dis­sem­i­na­tion or by any kind of act or demon­stra­tion.” At the same time, the regime gave wide rang­ing pow­ers to the Cap­tain Gen­eral of Cat­alo­nia, Emilio Bar­rera, who closed down po­lit­i­cal cen­tres, im­pris­oned Cata­lan mil­i­tants, and even ar­rested local coun­cil­lors.

20,000 Cata­lans

The “ob­ses­sion with Cata­lan na­tion­al­ism” that the of­fi­cial in Per­pig­nan re­marked on was ev­i­dent in any move­ment of Cata­lan ex­iles on the other side of the bor­der. The Span­ish au­thor­i­ties used rudi­men­tary pro­ce­dures, such as rip­ping down posters or try­ing to deter pro­test­ers, but also out­right il­le­gal means, such as ar­rest­ing peo­ple or break­ing into homes in French ter­ri­tory.

The his­to­rian Gio­vanni Cat­tini, who re­cently pub­lished the book ’L’aix­e­ca­ment de Prats de Molló’ (The Prats de Molló Up­ris­ing) has con­ducted a thor­ough search of the Span­ish archives and found many ex­am­ples of “po­lice sur­veil­lance and per­se­cu­tion by the Span­ish au­thor­i­ties” along with a good num­ber of let­ters and re­ports about the Cata­lans who lived on the other side of the bor­der. The sur­veil­lance of Cata­lans “was more or less con­stant from the start of the Primo de Rivera dic­ta­tor­ship,” says the his­to­rian. The Span­ish am­bas­sador to Paris re­peat­edly asked the con­suls of Per­pig­nan and Toulouse for in­for­ma­tion on the move­ments of the “sep­a­ratist” pro-in­de­pen­dence ac­tivists and then passed the in­tel­li­gence on to his su­pe­ri­ors or to Primo de Rivera him­self.

At that time, more than 20,000 Cata­lans were set­tled on the other side of the French bor­der, in North­ern Cat­alo­nia. The de­mand for labour caused by the Great War, the lack of op­por­tu­ni­ties in Spain, flee­ing mil­i­tary ser­vice in Mo­rocco as well as the re­pres­sion of the Primo de Rivera dic­ta­tor­ship were the main fac­tors that ex­plain this de­mo­graphic phe­nom­e­non.

Yet the move­ment of peo­ple from one side of the bor­der to the other was noth­ing new; it had been con­stant ever since the sign­ing of the Treaty of the Pyre­nees in 1659 that ended the Franco-Span­ish War that had begun in 1635. How­ever, from the sec­ond decade of the 20th cen­tury it be­came par­tic­u­larly in­tense, and by the end of the 1920s, some 25% of Per­pig­nan’s pop­u­la­tion had been born south of the bor­der. An ar­ti­cle pub­lished in 1923 in the mag­a­zine Estat Català high­lighted the pres­ence of over 12,000 mi­grants from the south.

Faced with these num­bers, the Span­ish con­sul in Per­pig­nan, Juan Bel, and the Span­ish am­bas­sador in Paris, José María Quiñones de León, worked hard to keep tabs on the Cata­lans, with par­tic­u­lar focus on what they con­sid­ered some “es­pe­cially dan­ger­ous” fig­ures. In the sum­mer of 1919, be­fore there was even a pro-in­de­pen­dence po­lit­i­cal party (the first, Estat Català, would not be formed until 1922), Bel kept a close eye on Josep Font­ber­nat, the head of the De­o­dat de Sev­erac Choir. Font­ber­nat had crossed the bor­der on De­cem­ber 13, 1918 to avoid join­ing the Span­ish army. He first set­tled in Per­pig­nan, where he founded the Cor Català choir. Soon, how­ever, he moved to Toulouse to be close to his mu­si­cal men­tor, De­o­dat de Sev­erac. In re­ports, the Span­ish con­sulate noted that the mu­si­cian had set up the Cor Català “which had per­formed var­i­ous ren­di­tions of re­gional songs”. At first Font­ber­nat did not pro­voke “any rea­son for com­plaint”, but once he had gained the trust of the choir’s mem­bers, “he did not dis­guise his ideas and sep­a­ratist pro­pa­ganda”.

A dan­ger­ous mu­si­cian

Font­ber­nat’s main sin was com­mit­ted on July 14, the French na­tional hol­i­day. On this day he con­ducted a con­cert at which the Cata­lan an­them, Els segadors, was per­formed, an ini­tia­tive that pro­voked a split in the Cor Català. From then on, note the re­ports, the mu­si­cian con­tin­ued “with his pro­pa­ganda, ex­cit­ing other Spaniards who were sep­a­ratists, but who had kept their ideas dor­mant.” Very con­cerned about Font­ber­nat’s ac­tions, the con­sul made as­sess­ments about his state of mind: “His young age mis­leads him and he does not mea­sure the con­se­quences of his ac­tions well.” Bel also did not hide the fact that he wanted to be rid of the mu­si­cian and rec­om­mended to the Span­ish am­bas­sador in Paris that “he es­tab­lish his res­i­dence in some other place where he can­not spread his pro­pa­ganda.”

Font­ber­nat came into con­tact with an­other fig­ure who was con­sid­ered “dan­ger­ous”: Francesc Macià, the politi­cian who founded the Estat Català pro-in­de­pen­dence party and who would later be­come Cata­lan pres­i­dent. In mid-Oc­to­ber 1923, a few days after the Primo de Rivera coup, Macià had man­aged to evade an ar­rest war­rant is­sued by the civil gov­er­nor of Lleida and had set him­self up in the Hotel de France in Per­pig­nan. The Span­ish au­thor­i­ties fol­lowed his move­ments closely. On 17 Feb­ru­ary, 1924, the same am­bas­sador re­ported that he had brought an event or­gan­ised for Macià to the at­ten­tion of the French au­thor­i­ties. The am­bas­sador, who was short of staff, pointed out that the French prime min­is­ter, Ray­mond Poin­caré, had promised to send French po­lice of­fi­cers to spy on the event and “to study what can be done to pre­vent the po­lit­i­cal pro­pa­ganda of the Cata­lan as­so­ci­a­tions”. In fact, in a num­ber of let­ters to Primo de Rivera, the am­bas­sador com­plained about his lack of re­sources, ar­gu­ing that he only had 158 pe­se­tas to over­see a colony of over 20,000 Cata­lan ex­iles.

An­other focus of Span­ish es­pi­onage was the city of Toulouse, where there was an ac­tive nu­cleus of Cata­lan na­tion­al­ists and which was home to one of Estat Català’s para­mil­i­tary squads known as es­camots. In 1924, in re­sponse to the Cata­lan lit­er­ary event known as the Jocs Flo­rals that were held in the city, the con­sul An­to­nio Gullón wrote: “this con­sulate is al­ways alert and an­tic­i­pates any sur­prises from the sep­a­ratist el­e­ments tak­ing refuge here.” The con­sul also praised the talks he had held with the mayor of Toulouse to avoid “the note of scan­dal that could be sounded by the pro-Cata­lan demon­stra­tion that was being pre­pared” and de­scribed the lit­er­ary event in a some­what hys­ter­i­cal man­ner: “It was a stri­dent man­i­fes­ta­tion of Cata­lan na­tion­al­ism, ex­ploit­ing the themes of home­land, faith and love to sing the an­them of the Cata­lan Na­tion op­pressed by the dic­ta­to­r­ial despo­tism of a Castil­ian gov­ern­ment and to pre­sent them­selves to the out­side world as a peo­ple thirsty to pur­sue their own des­tinies but en­slaved by the un­just yoke of a tyran­ni­cal peo­ple.”

Yet the con­sul was not only spy­ing on the Cata­lans but he also re­sorted to sab­o­tage. On 16 June, 1924, he in­formed the am­bas­sador that pro-Cata­lan sym­bols had ap­peared around the city cen­tre and on the façade of the main post of­fice build­ing, and that he had given pre­cise or­ders to his staff: “I have made sure they dis­ap­pear and that they be taken down im­me­di­ately.” Gullón had also be­come aware of the in­ter­na­tional ef­forts of the Cata­lan pro-in­de­pen­dence move­ment: “They are very op­ti­mistic about the out­come of the pro­ceed­ings be­fore the League of Na­tions. They in­sist that they have the un­con­di­tional sup­port of the small states that achieved in­de­pen­dence at the end of the Eu­ro­pean war and that they have pledged their votes in favour of recog­nis­ing the legal of­fi­cial sta­tus of the lan­guage and their in­de­pen­dence as a na­tion.”

The con­sul’s con­cerns, how­ever, were not only fo­cused on the diplo­matic ef­forts of the Cata­lans, but also on is­sues that on the face of it were not par­tic­u­larly dan­ger­ous to the in­tegrity of Spain: “Col­lec­tions of sep­a­ratist sym­bols have been sent out to be put up in pub­lic spaces... The di­rec­tor of the choir [Font­ber­nat] has re­ceived a large con­sign­ment of neck­er­chiefs in the sep­a­ratist colours, which he has dis­trib­uted among all the choir mem­bers, who con­stantly wear them openly, flaunt­ing them.”

In their cru­sade against the Cata­lan na­tion­al­ists, the Span­ish au­thor­i­ties never stopped putting pres­sure on the French. An ex­am­ple is the cel­e­bra­tion of the cul­tural gath­er­ing known as the Aplec d’Occitània. Days ear­lier, Gullón had re­ported that he had had a “long in­ter­view” with the pre­fect and that he had made it very clear that “the time had come to speak clearly and to find out whether the French au­thor­i­ties were re­ally friendly with Spain or whether they only seemed so and were pre­pared to tol­er­ate the Cata­lan na­tion­al­ist ma­noeu­vres, which are al­ready too fre­quent, sus­pi­cious and in­tol­er­a­ble”. Gullón also spoke to a mu­nic­i­pal of­fi­cial, telling him that he could “no longer tol­er­ate the dou­ble-sided game of the Mu­nic­i­pal­ity of Toulouse and that giv­ing pre­rog­a­tives and bel­liger­ence to the Cata­lan na­tion­al­ist el­e­ments was quite sim­ply anti-Span­ish pol­icy”.

With Macià ex­pected to at­tend the event, the con­sul tried to pre­vent the gath­er­ing from tak­ing place, but did not suc­ceed. He then fo­cused his ef­forts on pre­vent­ing Els segadors from being in­cluded in the pro­gramme. On the day of the con­cert, a po­lice com­mis­sioner warned Font­ber­nat that if Cat­alo­nia’s un­of­fi­cial an­them was sung, he and Macià would be ar­rested and ex­pelled from the coun­try. Yet Font­ber­nat dis­obeyed the order and the choir went ahead and sang the an­them: “The girls in the choir sang with their faces pale with an­guish at the fear of being put in prison,” Font­ber­nat would later ex­plain. The prob­lem for the Span­ish au­thor­i­ties was not only the ren­di­tion of Els segadors but also the speech that Macià gave in French and Cata­lan, in which he ex­posed “in all its crude­ness, his po­lit­i­cal ide­ol­ogy amid deroga­tory phrases about the Span­ish na­tion and its rulers”. After com­plet­ing his speech, the leader of Estat Català joined in with the singing of Els segadors to the con­sul’s great de­spair.

Frus­trated in­va­sion

How­ever, the pur­suit of in­de­pen­dence was fo­cused not only on pro­pa­ganda ac­tiv­ity but also on prepa­ra­tions for a mil­i­tary con­fronta­tion with the Primo de Rivera dic­ta­tor­ship. At the end of 1924, the con­sul of Toulouse sent a long re­port to the am­bas­sador in Paris, Quiñones de León, in­form­ing him that “mem­bers of the sep­a­ratist party led in France by Francesc Macià have begun ac­tiv­i­ties such as cre­at­ing se­cret com­mit­tees, keep­ing files on mem­bers, and each in­di­vid­ual adopts a co­de­name so that their cor­re­spon­dence is anony­mous”. All this led him to con­clude: “The Cata­lan na­tion­al­ist or­gan­i­sa­tion is tak­ing on a mil­i­tary char­ac­ter. Not only have com­pa­nies been cre­ated but re­cruit­ment op­er­a­tions are also being car­ried out… Ac­cord­ing to the or­ders that Mr Macià has ad­dressed to the groups, the mil­i­tary train­ing of these has begun in full, with train­ing marches, and I am as­sured that learn­ing in the use of the arms has even begun, with in­struc­tion in shoot­ing and the con­struc­tion of trenches.”

Macià’s plan to in­vade Cat­alo­nia with two armed columns and set up a re­pub­lic known as the Prats de Molló plot was dis­cov­ered and aborted in 1926, but the in­ter­na­tional at­ten­tion that Macià went on to re­ceive was in­fi­nitely greater than he would oth­er­wise have ob­tained. Dur­ing the trial in Paris that fol­lowed, which was cov­ered with par­tic­u­lar in­ter­est by the French press, the for­mer colonel spoke out in sup­port of the Cata­lan na­tional cause. In his first ad­dress to the court, Macià re­ferred to the Cata­lans that were im­pli­cated in the trial as em­body­ing “the per­sis­tence of the re­bel­lious spirit of the op­pressed Cat­alo­nia”. What is more, Macià spoke very much with French so­ci­ety in mind: “We want an in­de­pen­dent Cata­lan Re­pub­lic that is part of the con­sor­tium of Iber­ian peo­ples. A de­mo­c­ra­tic and peace­ful state along­side this free France for which 12,000 Cata­lan vol­un­teers died in Ver­dun,” he said at one point.

Macià also re­called that his goal was to de­stroy the Span­ish monar­chy, which he pointed out had tra­di­tion­ally been “an enemy of France” and that he would make Cat­alo­nia a “kind of Bel­gium in the Pyre­nees”. The re­port­ing of his words in the French press – as com­pared to the Span­ish press – shows that Macià man­aged to get his mes­sage across, and the myth of the na­tion’s ’Grand­fa­ther’ who was will­ing to do any­thing for the free­dom of his coun­try began to take shape.

fea­ture A his­tory of spy­ing on Cata­lans

fea­ture A his­tory of spy­ing on Cata­lans

fea­ture A his­tory of spy­ing on Cata­lans

Monitoring Companys

The officials in charge of the surveillance of the MP Mr Company (sic) inform me that yesterday he left his home at ten thirty and went by car together with Mr Soriano and Mr Layret to the house of the Count of Romanones. From there he went to eat at the house of Mr Soriano, where they entered at two o’clock. At four o’clock in the afternoon, Mr Company (sic) left and went to the Congress, where he stayed until nine thirty when he returned to his home.” The excerpt above is part of General Directorate of Security documentation in the National Historical Archive that has been recovered by the historian Josep M. Figueres. There are hundreds of these reports, covering the period from 1920 to 1924, into the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. They show that Lluís Companys was followed systematically, and not only when he went to have coffee with friends or lunch with his family, but also when he met ministers or when he attended the Congress, as in the report quoted above, which is dated 12 February, 1921. In some periods in which he was spied on, the future Catalan president held no public office and was merely practising as a lawyer; at other times he was a Member of Parliament with a public agenda. In his memoirs, Francisco Madrid, who was his secretary in the civil government in 1931, explains that the first thing Lluís Companys did when he took office was to consult his police file, which was especially voluminous.

A “flagrant border violation”

On 8 February, 1926, a group of six civil guards and two carabinieri crossed the French border and broke into a farm near Coustouges. There were four Catalan militants in the house. The French press reacted with indignation at the “flagrant border violation”, as the Evéil Catalan newspaper called it and the incident caused a scandal in the French press. Yet dictator Miguel Primo de Rivera denied the incident had taken place. In the words of historian Eduardo González Calleja, “this kind of unilateral intervention caused more concern among the French authorities than the subversive activities that they sought to stop.”

A kidnapping in France

On 27 August, 1924, while distributing propaganda against the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Perpignan, activist Cándido Rey was arrested by order of the Spanish consul and moved to Spanish territory. It was a full-fledged kidnapping that was condemned by the French press and the authorities, who expelled the Spanish consul in Perpignan and demanded Rey be handed over. At first, Spain’s military regime tried to use Rey as leverage to demand the repatriation of Francesc Macià, but the attempt failed and Rey was returned.

The spying ambassador

Spain’s ambassador in Paris, José María Quiñones de León, was committed to spying on the Catalan separatists. In his letters, he constantly demanded information from his collaborators, which he passed on to high-ranking officials of the dictatorship and even to Primo de Rivera himself. He also complained insistently about the alleged tolerance of the French authorities. He was born in Paris in 1873, after his father accompanied Isabel II into exile, and he died in 1957 in the same city. He began his diplomatic career as an attaché, and in 1918 the Conservative politician Antonio Maura appointed him ambassador, a position he held until 1931. On 14 April of that year, when the Second Republic was proclaimed, he resigned and became a devoted servant of the dethroned Alfonso XIII.

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